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LEGAL EXECUTION OF THE INSURED AS A DE-
FENSE TO AN ACTION ON A LIFE
INSURANCE POLICY.
By W. L. Summers*
Whether the legal execution of an insured, for a crime committed
by him, in absence of a condition in the policy excepting death by
such cause from the risk, should be allowed as a defense in an action
on a policy of life insurance contracted for by such insured on his
own life, whether made payable to his estate or a named beneficiary, is
a question upon which the courts of this country are in apparent
hopeless conflict. The question as thus stated is divisible into two
parts because two forms' of policies are concerned, that is, in the one
kind of policy the proceeds of the insurance are made payable to the
insured's estate or personal representative, while in the other kind of
policy the proceeds are made payable to a designated beneficiary.
Many courts,1 in considering suicide or other criminal acts of the in-
sured resulting in his death as a defense to an action on a policy of the
latter class, have held that the beneficiary has a vested property in-
terest therein which is not defeated by the act of the insured. Other
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
'r'itch v. Insurance Company, 59 N. Y. 577, 17 Am. Rep. 372; Patterson v. In-
surance Company, 100 Wis. 118, 75 N. W. 980, 42 L. R. A. 253, 69 Am. St. Rep.
9; Seller v. Association, 105 Iowa 87, 74 N. W. 980, 42 L. R. A. 253; Shipman v.
Protected Circle, 174 N. Y. 393, 67 N. E. 83, 63 I. R. A. 317; Darrow v. Society, 116
N. Y. 537, 22 N. E. 1093, 6 L. R. A. 495, 15 Am. St. Rep. 430; Morris v. Insurance
Co., 183 Pa. 563, 39 Atl. 52; Kerr v. Association, 39 Minn. 174, 39 N. W. 312, 12
Am. St. Rep. 631; G. L. I. 0. of Mutual Aid, 168 Ill. 408, 48 N. E. 59, 61 Am. St.
Rep. 123; Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Guller (Ind. App.) 11Y N. E. 173.
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courts have denied this distinction.2 Before taking up this distinc-
tion and its connection with the present subject under consideration
it is deemed advisable to review briefly the English and American
cases on legal execution.
The first case in which the legal execution of the insured was
urged as a defense on a policy of life insurance arose in England and
was decided by the House of Lords in 1830.3 The Lord Chancellor
in stating the opinion of the court said:
"The circumstances of the case are shortly these: In January,
1815, Henry Fauntleroy insured his life in the Amicable Society. In
the month of May in the same year he committed a forgery on the
Bank of England. He continued to pay the premiums on this in-
surance for a considerable period of time. In the year 1824, he was
apprehended, and on the 29th of October in that year he was declared
a bankrupt, and an assignment of his effects was made to the re-
spondents. On the following day, the 30th of October, he was tried
for this forgery; he was found guilty, sentenced to death, and in the
month of November following was executed.
"The question under these circumstances is this: whether the
assignees can recover against the Insurance Company the amount of
this insurance; that is to say, whether a party, effecting with an in-
surance company, an insurance upon his life, and afterwards com-
mitting a capital felony, being tried, convicted, and finally executed,
whether, under such circumstances, the parties representing.him, and
claiming under him, can recover the sum insured in the policy so
effected.
"It appears to me that this resblves itself into a very plain and
simple consideration. Suppose that in this policy itself this risk had
been insured against: that is, that the party insuring had agreed to
pay a sum of money year by year, upon condition, that in the event of
his committing a capital felony, and being tried, convicted, and execut-
ed for that felony, his assignees shall receive a certain sum of money-
is it possible that such a contract could be sustained? Is it not void on
the plainest principles of public policy ? Would not such a contract (if
available) take away one of those restraints operating on the minds
of men against the commission of crimes? Namely, the interest we
have in the welfare and prosperity of our connexions. Now if a policy
of that description, with such a form of condition inserted in it in
2Hopkins v. Northwestern Life Assurance CM., 94 Fed. 729, affirmed in 99
Fed. 199; Campbell v. Supreme Conclave I. 0. H., 66 N. T. L. 274, 54 L. R. A.
576, 49 Atl. 550.
3 The Amicable Society v. Bolland, 4 Bligh (U. S. 194, 211.)
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express terms, cannot, on grounds of public policy, be sustained, how
is it to be contended that in a policy expressed in such terms as the
present, and after the events which have happened, that we can sus-
tain such a claim? Can we, in considering this policy, give to it the
effect of that insertion, which if expressed in terms would have rend-
ered the policy, as far as that condition went at least, altogether void?
"Upon this short and plain ground, therefore, independently of
the more complicated arguments referred to by the counsel at the bar,
in the discussion of this case, I think that this policy cannot be sus-
tained, and that the respondents are not entitled to recover."
'4
The principles of public policy which furnished the basis of the
decision in the Bolland Case, supra, were adopted by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Mutual Life Insurance v. Ritter as one
of its reasons for deciding that suicide of an insured avoided a policy
of life insurance even tho there was no clause in the policy excepting
suicide of the insured from the risk.5 The court said:
"In support of the general proposition that the law will not en-
force contracts and agreements that are against ptiblic good, and are
therefore forbidden by public policy, reference is often made to the
case of the Amicable Society v. Bolland, 4 Bligh (N. S.) 194, 211."
The court then reviewed the facts of that case and quoted from
in the opinion as set out supra.
The question of legal execution of the insured as a defense to a
suit on policy of life insurance was squarely before the courts of this
country for the first time in Burt v. Union Central Life Insurance
Company,6 decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, in
1902. In that case the insured took out a policy on his own life pay-
able to his wife, if living, otherwise to his executors, administrators or
assigns. He was tried, convicted and executed for the murder of his
wife. The plaintiffs, as the assigns of the insured, brought action to
recover the proceeds of the policy. The defense of legal execution
was made but the plaintiffs claimed recovery on the ground that the
insured was not guilty of the crime for which he was executed. The
lower court refused evidence as to the innocence of the insured and
'Among the defenses urged by counsel were fraud and attainder
'Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Ritter, 169 U. S. 139, 18 Sup. Ct. 30, 42
L. Ed. 693.
6 17 U. S. 362, 47 L. Ed. 216, 23 Sup. Ct. 139.
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was sustained in its ruling by the Supreme Court on the ground that
if such proof were allowed, the contract, as insurance against the mis-
carriage of justice, would be contrary to public policy. As to legal
execution as a defense, apart from the question of he innocence of
the insured, the court said:
"The question therefore is whether an ordinary life policy, con-
taining no applicable special provisions, is a binding contract to in-
sure against a legal execution for crime. The petitioners would dis-
tinguish between cases in which the insured is justly convicted and
executed and those in which he is unjustly convicted.
"Accepting the division made by counsel as one facilitating a
just conclusion concerning the rights of the parties hereto we inquire,
-first, whether a policy of life insurance is a contract, binding the in-
surer to pay to the beneficiary the amount of the policy in case the in-
sured is legally and justly executed for crime. In other words, do in-
surance policies insure against crime? Is that a risk which enters
into and becomes a part of the contract?
"The researches of counsel have found but one-case directly in
point, the Amicable Society v. Bolland, decided by the House of Lords
in 1830, and reported in 4 Bligh (N. S.) 194, 211. The Lord Chan-
cellor, delivering the opinion, after stating the question, answered it
in the following brief but cogent words"
At this point the court quotes the opinion of the English court as
set out supra, and quoted in the Ritter Case, supra. The learned
justice then discussed and compared the facts in the Burt and Bolland
Cases showing similarity and continued as follows:
"The plaintiffs therefore in each of the cases claimed directly
under the insured and sought to recover on a policy obtained by him,
the maturity of which was accelerated by his execution for crime; in
neither was there any express stipulation in respect to such a conting-
ency, so that the reasoning of the Lord Chancellor is pertinent to this
case and it is reasoning the force of which it is impossible to avoid.
It cannot be that one of the risks covered by the contract of insurance
is the crime of the insured. *There is an implied obligation on his part
to do nothing to wrongfully accelerate the maturity of the policy. Pub-
lic policy forbids the insertion in a contract of a condition which would
tend to induce crime, and as it forbids the introduction of such a
*Italics used are the writer's.
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stipulation it also forbids the enforcement of a contract under cir-
cumstances which cannot be lawfully stipulated for."
The court referred to the Ritter Case, supSa, and its approval of
the Bolland Case and the dicta of some American cases7 wherein this
doctrine of public policy has met approval.
In 1907 the question under discussion was before the Supreme
Court of Illinois in Collins v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.8
In that case one Kilpatrick had insured his life making the policy
payable to his personal representatives. He was legally executed for
erime and this was urged as a defense to a suit on the policy. The
Illinois court took the view that-a policy of ir)urance is a species of
property; that the principle of public policy upon which the Bolland
Casc was decided was based on the doctrine of attainder ; that since
forfeiture of estate and corruption of blood for crime are prohibited
by the Constitution of Illinois there could be no such rule of public
policy in that state and consequently legal execution of the insured
was not a valid defense to the action. The court said in part:
"An insurance policy payable to the estate or personal repre-
sentatives of the assured is a species of property. It is in the nature
of a chose in action, which, subject to certain conditions, varying ac-
cording to the terms of the contract, is payable on the contingency of
death or at a stated time. Life insurance has become an important
factor in the commercial and social life of our people. To protect
their credit. save their estates from embarrassment, and provide for de-
pendent ones, the people of this state pay annually over $30,000,000 in
premiums for lffe insurance. . . . The amount of insurance. carried
is approximately $1,000,000,000. Why should this enormous property
interest be subject to any different conditions than those applying to
any other property owned by the people ? If a man who is executed
for crime has at his death $1,000 in real estate, $1,000 in chattels, and
$1,000 life insurance payable to his estate, his real estate descends to
his heir, and his personal chattels to his administrator, but the $1,000
life insurance must be left in the hands of the company who has re-
7 Hatch v. Mutual Life Insurance Company, 120 Mass: 550, 552; New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591, 0; Supreme Commandery. &c. v.
Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436, 446.
a22 Iii. 37, 84 N. E. 452, 14 L. H. A. (N. S.) w, 122 Am. St. Rep. %2 13 Ann.
Can. 129.
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ceived the premiums because it is said to be contrary to public policy
to require the company to pay, lest by so doing it lend encouragement
to other policyholders to seek murder, and execution therefor, in order
that their estates or heirs might profit thereby. This is defendant in
error's position. This contention seems to border closely upon the
absured. We know of no rule of public policy in this state that will en-
force this species of forfeiture, but there is a rule of law which has
often been applied when two parties make a. valid contract and the
same has been completely performed by one party and nothing re-
mains except the performance by the other, which will compel per-
formance or award damages for default against the delinquent party."
The question was before the Supreme Court of the United States
a second time in the well known case of Northwestern Life Insurance
Company v. McCue.9 In that case McCue insured his own life making
the policy payable to his executors, administrators or assigns. He
was executed for the murder of his wife. An action on the policy was
instituted by the infant heirs of McCue, but later, by agreement of
parties, his executors were also considered parties plaintiff. Mr.
Justice McKenna wrote the opinion of the court. After stating the
facts he said:
"The main question in the case is, as we said, the liability of the
company under the circumstances. Or, to put it more abstractly for
the present purposes of our discussion, whether a policy of life insur-
ance insures against death by legal execution for crime."
The court then quoted from the opinions of that court in the
Burt and Ritter Cases, supra, and continued:
I
"These cases must be accepted as expressing the views of this
court as to the public policy which must determine the validity of
insurance policies, and which they cannot transcend even by explicit
declaration, much less be held to transcend by omissions or im-
plications."
After discussing other questions the court concluded:
"One other contention of the respondents remains to be noticed.
It is contended that if the McCue estate cannot recover, the innocent
parties, his children, will be admitted as claimants. To this conten-
tion we repeat what we have said above, the policy is the measure of
0223 U. S. 234, 32 Sup. Ct. 220, 56 Law Ed. 419, S&-L. 1. A. (N. S.) 57.
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the rights of everybody under it, and as it does not cover death by the
law, there cannot be recovery either by McCue's estate or by his
children."
The rule of the English and Federal decisions was followed in a
case before the Supreme Court of North Carolina in 1916.10 In that
case the insured took out a policy on his own life naming a beneficiary
but reserving the right to name another instead. The policy, like that
of cases above, contained no clause stipulating for or against liability
of the company in event of death of the insured by legal execution.
The insured was electrocuted for the crime of murder. The beneficiary
brought suit to recover the proceeds of the policy and the defense of
legal execution was made. The court said:
"Upon the facts stated the only question presented on appeal
is: Does an ordinary life insurance policy, in the absence of any
provision in regard thereto, insure against death by act of law ad-
ministered as a punishment for the commission of a capital felony?
We do not think that the parties to the contract contemplated such
an extraordinary risk, or that the terms of the policy include it.
If such stipulation had been inserted in the policy, it would be in-
surance against the commission of crime, and void as against sound
principles of public policy."
The court then cites the Bolland, Ritter, Burt, and cieCue Cases,
supra. Of the Collins Case, supra, it was said:
"The only case that militates against our conclusion is, Collins
v. Insurance Company (citing it); but that decision seems to be
based upon a provision of the state Constitution declaring that no
conviction shall work a corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate. It
is not necessary that we should discuss that case, except to say that
we do not regard it as a precedent to be followed."
" Scarborough v. American National Life Insurance Co., 171 N. C. 353, 88 S. B.
482, L. R. A. 1918 A. 896.
"The Illinois Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 11, provides: "All penalties shall be
proportioned to the nature of the offense; and no conviction shall wokk corrup-
tion of blood or forfeiture of estate."
Article XI, Sec. 1 of the North Carolina Constitution, provides: "The follow-
ing punishments only shall be known to the laws of this state, viz., death, im-
prisonment with or without hard labor, fines, removal from office, and disquali-
fication to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit under this state."
Article I, Sec. 21 of the Texas Constitution provides: "No conviction shal"
work corruption of blood, or forfeiture of estate; and the estates of those who
destroy their own lives shall descend or vest as in case of natural death."
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The last case decided on this subject was before the Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas in 1918.12 The facts in that case were almost iden-
tical with those in the North Carolina case, supra, the defendant in
both suits being the same company. The court said:
"The question, therefore, for our determination is this: does an
ordinary life insurance policy, in the absence of any provision in re-
gard thereto, insure against death by act of the law of the land ad-
mninistered as a punishment for crime? We have reached the con-
Olusion that the question must receive a negative answer."
After citing -with approval the Burt and -McCue Cases, supra, the
court continued:
"It is unnecessary for this court to discuss the reasoning of the
$bipreme Court of the United States in reaching its conclusion in the
:ibove mentioned cases as such reason speaks for itself, and in the
tpinion of this court, the same is not only legally sound, but com-
ports wifli the highest public policy and common sense."
In referring to the Collins case. supra, the court said:
"We have read carefully Collins v. Tnsurance Company, and as
said by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, we do not regard
this case as a precedent to be followed in Texas, but prefer to fol-
low the Supreme Court of the United State. and that of North
Carolina. w' well as others holding contrary to the views expressed
by the Illinois court."
The facts and opinions of the foregoing cases have been set forth
for the purpose of showing as clearly as possible the reasons and
principles upon which the courts have based their opinions. At this
point in the discussion it is sufficient: to call attention to the fact
that in the eases where the defense of legal execution has. been al-
lowed, the judges have assumed that the rights of -the plaintiff,
whether beneficiary or personal representative 'of the insured, were
based 'on contract, and have accordingly applied thereto rules of
public policy governing contracts. On the other hand, in the case
where the defense was denied, the court assumed that the right of the
American National Life Insurance Company v. Munson, 202 S. W. 97.
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plaintiff, who there was the personal representative of the insured,
was one of property, and finding no rule of public policy in that
state preventing the descent of property of a murderer to his heirs
or personal representatives, very naturally held, that the legal execu-
tion of the insured was no defense to an action by the personal repre-
sentative to recover the property. With assumptions of the courts
.s to the nature of rights created by a policy of insurance so different,
it is not surprising that opposite conclusions were reached. Had
any of the courts taken the pains to analyze the life insurance con-
tract and determine the nature. of the rights of a named beneficiary
and the personal representative of the insured, under the forms of
policies above mentioned, it is believed that the present conflict on
this subject would not exist. It is proposed, therefore, to determine,.
if possible, the nature of the rights created by a life insurance policy.
It is well settled that the ordinary life insurance policy is an
executory,13 conditional' 4 contract of investment,1 5 based on a contin-
-gency,16 whereby the insured agrees to pay to the insurer an annuity
until the happening of the contingency. in consideration of the in-
tiurer agreeing to pay the insured's personal representative or named
beneficiary, a certin larger sum upon the bappening of the contin-
gency. The contingency in the ordinary life policy is the death of
the insured. The amount of the annuities agreed to be paid are de-
termined according to the life expectancy of the insured so as to be
of such number and amount as will provide a fund for the payment
of the amount due the beneficiary or representative of the insured at
the end of the period of life expectancyY.7
It was pointed out above that the ordinary life insurance policy
by which a man insures his own life may assume either of two forms.
In one the proceeds of the policy are made payable to the estate
Jor personal rQpresentatives of the insured, and in the other they are
"3 Vance on Insurance, page 47; Joyce on Insurance, Second Edition, Sec. 20.
,1 Vance on Insurance, page 47; Joyce on Insurance, Second Edition, Sec. 22.
=Vance on Insurance, page 56; Grigsby v. Russel, 2= U. S. 149, 54 Law Ed.
133, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 642. Life insurance not a contract of indemnity; see
Dalby v. The India & London Life Assurance Co., 15 C. B. 265; Vance on Insur-
ance, page 57, and cases cited; Joyce on Insuranpe, Second Edition, See. 26 and
cases cited.
"Vance on Insurance, page 47.
"Vance on Insurance, page 47; Ritter v. Mutual Life Insurance Co,, 10 U. S.
139, 1 Sup. Ct. 300, 42 L. Ed. WJ,
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made payable to a designated beneficiary. Because of the distinction,'
contended for by some of the courts,18 between the nature of the in-
terest created in the respective parties to be benefited by the two
kinds of policies, and the effect of a crime of the insured resulting
in his death upon such interests, it becomes necessary to discuss them
separately.
It must be admitted that the courts are prone to say that an in-
surance policy is a chose in action, and as such, property. But it is
necessary to bear in mind that the contract is executory during the
lifetime of the insured; that there is no present right to the proceeds
of the policy, in the nature of contract or property in anyone until the
contract becomes executed; that the contract cannot become executed
until the happening of the contingency upon which it is based, and
then only in the event that all of the conditions thereof, express or im.
plied, have been fulfilled. If they mean anything definite, to what
then do the courts refer when they say that a policy of insurance is a
chose in action in the nature of property? It is not denied that a policy
payable to the estate or personal representative of an insured, is, after
his death, an asset for the payment of his debts,19 but in that case the
contract is executed, the conditions are fulfilled, and the contingency
has happened. An unmatured policy, on the other hand, is an asset
available to creditors of the insured only when, according to the terms
of the contract, the policy has an absolute money value, but in all other
cases where the liability of the insurer is contingent, the policy is not
to be regarded as available assets.20 Such surrender value is the only
property which passes to the assignee in bankruptcy of the insured
under the bankruptcy law.2 1 This doctrine that an insurance policy
12 See cases cited in note 1.
'5 Trepagnier v. Rose, 18 App. Div. 393, 46 N. Y. Supp. 397, affirmed 155 X. Y.
637, 46 N. E. 1105; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Willis, 70 Tex. 12, 6 S. W. 825, 8 Am. St.
Rep. 566; Girard Insurance Co. v. Field, 41 Pa. 129; Sexton v. Insurance Co., 12
N. C. 1, 43 S. E. 479.
" Columbia Bank v. Equitable Life Assn., S0 N. Y. Supp. 428; 1 Freeman on
Executions, Sec. 164a; Long v. Brittiana Co., 94 Va. 594, 27 S. E. 4M; Barbour
v. Insiirance Co., 61 Conn. 240, 23 Atl. 154; Pace v. Pace, i9 Fla. 438; Barbour's
Adm. v. Larne's Assignee, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 94, 51 S. W. 5; Day v. Ins. Co., 1n
Pa. 507, 4 Atl. 478, 56 Am. Rep. 297; Boisseau v. Bass' Adm., 100 Va. 207, 40 S. E.
647.
u Bankruptcy Act of 1893, c. 541, see. 70 (a) (5) as amended by act of Feb. 5,
1903, c. 487; Burlington v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 549; Everett v. Judson, 229 U. S. 474;
Andrews v. Partridge, 228 U. S. 479; In re Judson, 192 Fed. 834.
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is a chose in action is by no means consistently applied. Assuming
by this doctrine that the courts mean to say that the insured or his
personal representative has a property (chose) in the proceeds of the
policy which may be recovered by an action. Such action cannot be
brought by the insured, for during his lifetime there is no obligation
on part of the insurer to pay. The only, right the insured has is to re-
cover a surrender value and discontinue the policy, or the alternative
right to continue the policy in force according to the terms and con-
ditions provided for in the contract. Suppose the insured dies, the
representative has a right to sue and recover the proceeds of the
policy, provided all conditions of the policy have been complied with.
How did the personal representative get this right to sue, which the
insured did not have ? He undoubtedly acquired it by virtue of the
contract, yet the Supreme Court of Illinois would have us believe
that the insured, from the inception of the policy, had a property in-
terest in the proceeds thereof which passed by descent to his personal
representative. It is submitted that this theory of the Illinois Court
is wholly unsound on reason and principle. To repeat the error then
of the Illinois Court in the Collins case is in assuming that the con-
tract of insurance gives to the insured a property right in the proceeds
of the policy, which property right goes to the personal representative
by descent unhampered by any rule of public policy governing con-
tracts which might affect the policy or the ultimate right to the pro-
ceeds thereof. By this theory the insured is given power to pass by
descent a property which he did not have during life. Conceding,
for the sake of argument, that the insured did have a property in the
proceeds of the policy during his lifetime and a right to sue for the
recovery of such property and that such property and right of action
passed to the personal representative by descent, an action by the
personal representative to recover the proceeds of the policy would
still be based on contract and a defense that the contract was contrary
to public policy would still be good.
The right of action, therefore, which the personal representative
of an insured has to sue for recovery of the proceeds of an insurance
policy contracted for by the insured and made payable to his estate
or personal representatives, is a right based on contract, dependent for
its validity upon the proper performance of the express or implied
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conditions of the contract, and upon the rules of public policy govern-
ing contracts, and is not, as the Supreme Court of Illinois assumes, a
property right in the insured passing by descent to his personal repre-
sentative and governed solely by rules of public policy affecting the
devolution of property. For this conclusion there is ample author-
ity,22 altho it is to be regretted that the courts in passing upon the
validity of the defenses of legal execution and suicide in suits for
recovery of proceeds of an insurance policy have not more fully de-
fined their position in this respect.
'When anl insured contracts for insurance upon his own life and
the policy provides that- the proceeds thereof shall be payable uncon-
ditionally to a designated individual, practically all of the courts
agree that such beneficiary takes a vested interest in the policy in-
defeasible by an act of the insured without the beneficiary's consent,
and that such right is one of property capable of being seized for the
beneficiary's debts, of passing by descent to his personal representa-
tive, or '15 his will or assignment.28 Where the right of the designated
beneficiary to take may be defeated by a condition subsequent it is
said to be conditionally vested, and if the right is dependent upon a
condition precedent the interest acquired is contingent, capable of
becoming vested, but if insured reserves the privilege of changing the
beneficiary at will then the named beneficiary has nothing more than a
mere expectancy of benefit. 24 Many courts have held that suicide, or
other wrongful act of the insured resulting in his death, is not a de-
fense to an action by a beneficiary to recover the proceeds of a policy,
on the ground that the vested right acquired cannot be defeated by
the insured's wrongful act, and thus make the distinction referred to
above between policies payable to a beneficiary and those payable to
22 Ritter v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 169 U. S. 1W, IS Sup. Ct.
200, 42 L. Ed. 693; Amicable Society v. Bolland, 4 Bligh (N. R.) 194; Northwestern
Life Insurance Co. v. McCue, 223 U. S. 234, 32 Sup. Ct. 220, M L. Ed. 419, 38
L. Ri. A. (N. S.) 57; Burt v. Union Central L. Ins. Co., 187 U. S. 362, 23 Sup. Ct.
W, 47 L. Ed. 216; Scarborough v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co, 171 N. C. 353, 88 S. fl. 482;
Am. Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Munson, (Texas) 202 S. W. 987.
Joyce on Insurance, Second Edition, Vol. 2, sec. 730, and cases cited; Vance
on Insurance, pages 390-395; Bacon on Life and Accident Insurance, Fourth Edi-
tion, sec. 377; Bliss on Life Insurance, sec. 318; 14 R. C. L. 1376, and cases cited;
11 Am. St. Rep. 296, note.
Vance on Insurance, pages 390 to 400, and cases cited; Joyce on Insurance,
Second Edition, see. 730 to 756; Bacon on Life and Accident Insurance, Fourth
Edition, sec.'79, 381; 14 R. C. L. I37-1,90.
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personal representatives. 25 In some cases the distinction is made
even tho the beneficiary has no vested interest.26 But other courts
hold that where the right is reserved to change the beneficiary, as is
usually the case in mutual benefit insurance, the same principles
should apply as to policies payable to insured's estate or personal
representatives.
27
In none of the decided cases wherein legal execution of the in-
sured was urged as a defense to a recovery on the policy was the dis-
tinction made between policies payable to the legal representative and
to a beneficiary, for the simple reason the plaintiffs in none of those
cases had a vested interest. It becomes necessary, therefore, to de-
termine, if possible, the nature of this vested right acquired by the
beneficiary, and the effect, if any, of such an interest upon the de-
fense of legal execution set up by the insurer in a suit by a beneficiary
to recover the proceeds of a life policy.
There is no .question but that the bene~eiary named in a life
policy takes such an interest therein that he may, upon the maturity
of the policy, sue fo. and recover the proceeds thereof. The courts
have proposed various theories, none of which are altogether satis-
factory, by which the beneficiary in the insurance contract is given
this peculiar vested and indefeasible property right so different to
that ordinarily given a third person by a contract made for his bene-
fit.28 It is believed, however, that the manner in which the right is
secured is not necessary of determination in this discussion. The
question here is, does the beneficiary have, from the inception of the
policy, a vested property right in the proceeds of the policyl If it
is again recalled that the liability of the insurer to pay the proceed.
of the policy is dependent upon the proper performance of all ex-
press and implied conditions of the contract and upon the happenhig
of the contingency upon which it is based, it is then evident that when
the courts speak of the vested interest of the beneficiary they do not
and cannot properly mean that he has a vested interest in the pro-
U See cases dited in note' supra.
U Grand Legion v. Beaty, 224 ni. 346, 79 N. D. 65, 8 L. R. A. (N'. S.) 1124, and
mote; Parker v. Des Moines Life Ass'n., 108 Iowa 117, 78 N. W. 826.
*7 Shipman v. Protected Rome Circle, 174 N. Y. 398, 67 N. E. 83, 63 L. R. A.
347; Davis v. Supreme Council Royal Arcanum, 195 Mass. 402, S1 N. E. 294, 10
L. R. A. (N. S.) 722. See cases collected in note in 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1W24.
U See Vance on Insurance, page 03 for discussion of the principles involved.
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ceeds of the policy.29 It is meant only that the beneficiary has a
vested right to receive the money that shall become due and payable
upon a proper performance of the contract. In those cases, pointed
out supra,3 0 where it is held that the right of the beneficiary cannot
be defeated by the wrongful act of the insured, the courts have in
effect held that altho the vested right of the beneficiary may be de-
feated by breach of an express condition of the contract but not by
breach of an implied condition thereof or because the contract is con-
trary to public policy. To illustrate: Suppose A insures his life for
the benefit of B and that in the policy there is an express condition
that if A goes to Mexico the policy will be void, and an implied con-
dition that if A commits suicide while sane the policy will likewise
be void, and still further that there is a rule of public policy which
prevents a recovery on the policy if A commits suicide while sane.
Now this group of cases hold that if A goes to Mexico B's vested
interest is gone and he cannot bring action to recover the proceeds.
But, on the other hand, they hold, without denying the existence of the
implied condition or the rule of public policy, that a breach of either
does not destroy B's vested interest. By holding that the breach of
the express condition destroys the beneficiary's interest they admit
that his right is based upon contract. Yet by holding that the breach
of the implied condition does not have the same effect they make a
distinction between the effect of the breach of express and implied
condition of contract for which there is no sound reason. And by
holding in effect that the rights of the beneficiary are not defeated by
the breach of the rule of public policy, they deny the principle that
the beneficiary's rights are dependent upon the validity and proper
performance of the contract of insurance, which they admitted in
holding his rights defeated by breach of the express condition.
For the foregoing reason it is believed that this distinction made
between policies wherein the beneficiary has a vested interest, on the
one hand, and those wherein his right is not vested or where tile pro-
ceeds are made payable to the insured's estate or personal representa-
tive, on the other hand, as to the right of the respective parties to re-
2 Hopkins v. Northwestern Life Assurance Co., 99 Fed. 199; Vance on Insur-
ance, page 391.
21 See cases cited in note 1.
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cover on the policy where suicide of the insured is a defense, is wholly
unsound. It is believed that the doctrine of vested interest of the
beneficiary was made use of by these courts in an attempt to avoid the
conclusions of the Ritter Case. There would be much less confusion in
the law upon this subject if these courts had openly repudiated the
doctrine of the Ritter case instead of attempting, as they did, to get
around it by constructing the above mentioned erroneous distinction.
This distinction has been repudiated by courts and writers on other
grounds.
31
It is submitted therefore that the right of a beneficiary named
in a contract of insurance, to sue for the recovery of the proceeds of
the policy, is a right dependent upon the proper performance of both
the express and implied conditions of that contract, as well as upon
the validity of the contract as determined by the rules of public
policy. And that there is no sound distinction between the nature of
the right of such beneficiary and the right of the personal representa-
tive to sue for the proceeds of a policy made payable to the insured's
estate personal representative. Therefore where suit is brought on
a life cy and the defense is the legal execution of the insured the
validity of such defense should in no way be dependent upon whether
the plaintiff sues as the personal representative or the beneficiary of
the insured.
The conclusions of this discussion to this point may be sum-
marized as follows:
(1) Where a suit is brought by the personal representative of the
insured to recover the proceeds of an ordinary life insurance policy
made payable to the estate or personal representatives of the insured,
and the legal execution of the insured is interposed as a defense, the
right of such plaintiff is based upon contract and the validity of such
right must be determined by rules of public policy governing contracts
and not rules of public policy governing the descent of property. To
this extent the decisions of the House of Lords and the Supreme
21 Hopkins v. Northwestern Life Assurance Co., 94 Fed. 729, affirmed on other
grounds in 40 C. C. A. 1, 99 Fed. 199; Campbell v. Supreme Conclave I. 0. EL, 66
N. 3. L. 274, 54 L. R. A. 576, 49 Ati. 550; Davis v. Supreme Council, etc., 195 Mass.
40, 81 N. E. 294, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 722. See case note in 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) pages
1124, 1128.
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Court of the United States are correct and the decision of the Supreme
Court of Illinois is wrong.
(2) That the rights of one named as a beneficiary in a policy of
life insurance are also based on contract,whether his rights may be said
to be vested or not vested; and that there is no such difference in the
interest of a beneficiary who has vested rights and the interest of the
beneficiary whose rights are not vested, that would defeat the de-
fense of legal execution of the insured, whether based on ground of
public policy or breach of an implied condition, in the one instance,
and allow it in the other.
Having arrived at the foregoing conclusions, it now remains to
determine if there really is such a doctrine of public policy governing
the contract of insurance or an implied condition in every life insur-
ance policy that will have the effect of preventing a recovery by the
benelciary or personal representative where the insured has been
legally executed for crime. It becomes necessary to investigate the
reason and theory upon which these principles are based.
In the Bolland Case one reason only was given why legal execu-
tion should constitute a defense.
"Would not such a contract (if available) take away one of
those restraints operating on the minds of men against the commis-
sion of crime--namely, the interest we have in the welfare and pros-
perity of our connexions.'"
,Here are two principles of public policy united. One is, that
no one should be permitted to make a contract that might incite him
to commit crime. The other, that no man should be allowed to benefit
himself or kin by his own wrong. It is necessary to make use of both
principles to formulate a rule relative to insurance contracts, because
the contract could not be said to violate the first rule, that is, inciting
crime, unless there also existed the temptation or desire to benefit by
the crime. The use of implied condition as mentioned in this opinion
is merely for the purpose of giving effect to the rule of public policy
which is the basis of the decision.
In the Burt Case the court gives two reasons why the plaintiff
there could not recover:
(1) "There is an implied obligation on his part to do nothing to
wrongfully accelerate the maturity of the policy." (2) "Public policy
Legal Execution as Defense to Action on Life Insurance Policy 17
forbids the insertion in a contract of a condition which would tend
to induce crime."
The Supreme Court in the MeCue Case adopted the above
reasons. The North Carolina and Texas courts did likewise. This
additional doctrine of implied obligation was apparently taken from
the opinion of Justice Harlan in the Ritter Case. Justice Harlan may
have taken it from the argument of counsel in the Bolland Case for it
was strongly urged there.3 2
It seems to be plain that the courts in this country, which have
allowed legal execution as a defense in an action on an insurance
policy, have based their decisions upon the two reasons set out in the
Burt Case. These two reasons are also the basis of the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the Ritter Case, where suicide
of the insured was the defense. Furthermore the courts in the legal
execution cases have expressly stated the reasons set out in the Ritter
Case are applicable where legal execution of the insured is a de-
fense.3 3 It would seem to be conclusive then that one desiring to ques-
tion the soundness of these principles must turn the opinion of Justice
Harlan in the Ritter Case where these principles and the reasons
supporting them are ably set forth.
In the Ritter Case it was held that the suicide while sane of an
insured is a defense to an action on a life policy, even if the policy
does not expressly declare that it shall be void in such a case. For
this decision two main reasons are given, first, that there is an implied
obligation in every contract of life insurance that the insured will
do nothing wrongfully to accelerate the maturity of the policy, and
second, that public policy forbids the insertion in a contract, express-
ly or by implication, a condition which might incite or induce the
insured to commit crime.
To support this first main principle three arguments are made
which are more or less dependent upon each other. The first of these
is, that the life tables upon which the contract of insurance is based
do not include in their estimates death by crime or suicide. Since such
2See argument of counsel for appellants in Amicable Society v. Bolland, 4
Bligh N. S. 194, 207.
"Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v.,.McCue, supra; Ritter v. Mutual Life Insur-
ance Company, supra.
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a risk was not in the c6ntemplation of the parties, the court reasons
that it should be excepted from the policy by an implied condition,
even tho the parties failed to do so by express stipulation. Justice
Harlan cites no authority to show the basis upon which the life tables
are computed. It appears that most of such tables are based on death
records or certain groups of persons covering a period of years. The
causes of death of individuals of the groups selected do not appear to
have entered in any way into the calculation of the averages. 34
This statement of Justice Harlan has also been denied by other
courts.3 5 The Supreme Court of Nebraska in speaking of the Ritter
Case said:
"We find on examination of that opinion that the reasoning of
the learned judge who wrote it was to some extent based on the as-
sumption that the experience tables used as a basis for fixing the con-
sideration to be paid for such insurance exclude suicide as a cause
of mortality, but we find it to be a fact as shown by the -authorities,
and one which we have never heard questioned, that all of the mor-
tality or experience tables used as a basis for computing premiums
on life insurance, and assessments for carrying benefit certificates in
fraternal benefit associations, include all forms of death, of which
suicide is considered one."
The first argument then to support the principle of implied con-
dition seems to be based on an erroneous assumption of fact.
The second argument to support the existence of an implied con-
dition is that the insurer does not contemplate incurring the risk of
death by suicide, for, if he knew that the insured would take his own
life the contract would never be made, and to allow a recovery on such
a policy would be fraud on the insurer. The authorities all agree
that if an insurer contracts for life insurance in contemplation of
suicide that to allow recovery on such a policy would be fraud on th@
insurer, on the simple .ground of concealment of a fact material to
the ris.k.3 6 But here fraud is claimed regardless of any intention on
part of the insured at the time of making the contract to take his own
34 Gephart, Principles of Insurance, page 48.
Campbell v. Supreme Conclave I. 0. H., 66 N. J. L. 274, 49 Atl. 550, 54 L.
Rt. A. 576; Lange v. Royal Highlanders (Neb.) 110 N. W. MlO.
21 Joyce on -Insurance, (Second Edition), sec. 2652; 14 R. C. L. Insurance, sec.
410; Vance on Insurance, page 518.
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life. The fact the insurer did not contemplate the risk of suicide
seems to be the basis of the fraud. This fact of the insurer's state of
mind is in turn based on the assumption that the mortality tables do
not include suicide, as a cause of death. -This latter proposition has
been shown to be erroneous, therefore this argument of fraud based on
it must fail. For if the contract does, in absence of express exception,
insure against death by suicide, there can be no fraud on the insurer.
As a third ground of support of the doctrine of implied condi-
tion it is said that insurance against death by suicide could not have
been within the contemplation of the parties at the inception of the
contract, for if it was, the happening of the contingency upon which
the liability of one party is to arise would thereby be wholly left at
the option of the other. This, it is asserted, "is against the very es-
sence of the contract." To prove the soundness of this statement
Justice Harlan makes use of that ancient and false analogy between
property and life insurance which was urged by counsel in the Bol-
land Case, and first uttered by Lord Campbell, obiter, in Moore, v.
Woolsey:3
7
"If a man insures his life for a year, and commits suicide within
the year, his executors cannot recover on the policy, as the owner of
a ship who insures her for a year cannot recover on a policy if within
the-year he causes her to sink."
To prove that such analogy is false and inapplicable it is only
necessary to recall that life insurance is not a contract of indemnity
but an agreement to pay a fixed sum on the happening of an inevitable
event, and without regard to the value of the life or the loss sus-
tained.88
The second main principle upon which the doctrine of the Ritter
Case is based, public policy, is formulated by welding together well
known postulates of public policy;-first, that no contract should be
enforced which by its terms incites one of the parties to commit crime,
and second, no one should be allowed to benefit by his own wrong.
' Moore v. Woolsey, 4 El. & Bl. 243.
U Joyce on Insurance, Second Edition, see. 26, and cases cited; Bacon, Life
and Accident Insurance, Fourth Edition, sec. 201; Vance on Insurance, page
56. See also Lange v. loyal Highlanders, 75 Neb. 188, 106 N. W. 224, 110 N. W.
1110; Campbell v. Supreme Conclave I. 0. H., 66 N. J. L. 274,.54 L. R. A. 576.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL.
The rule claimed to result is that no man should be allowed to insure
against death by suiciae, for thereby he would be incited to commit
"suicide, or commit a crime and have himself legally executed for the
purpose of benefiting himself or his beneficiaries. The two original
maxims of public policy are not questioned, but their jointure and
the resultant principle as applicable to life insurance is luestioned.
Under this rule there are only two inducements stated, which, it is
claimed, might cause the insured to commit crime; first, to benefit
himself, and second, to benefit his dependents or beneficiaries. The
soundness of this whole doctrine then must depend upon the strength
of these inducements upon the mind of the insured and the attendant
injury to the welfaie of the public in general. The force of these al-
leged inducements, it is submitted; upon the mind of the insurer, must
be measured by the manner in which they effect the mind of the person
-of average power of mind and intellect and not in the manner which
they might affect the person of weakened or inferior power of mind.
The first question amounts to this is the average minded individual in-
duced to commit suicide in hopes of gaining benefit from a contract
which is matured by his death ? To show there is an inducement it
must first be shown that there is belief in the mind of the individual
that he is to have benefit, which is to come to him at his death. Some
things, even to the average individual, are dearer than life, but such
things are not to be measured in terms of dollars and cents, particu-
lary such amounts as an insurance policy may represent. Benefit as
used in this maxim means material and not moral or spiritual benefit.
It is impossible to see how any person may gain benefit by his own
death where death is condition precedent to the benefit, nor do the
supporters of the alleged principle show there is such a bendfit to be
gained, or such a hope of benefit in the mind of the average person
who has a life insurance policy. If there is no hope or belief of benefit
there is no inducement. If no inducement there is no breach of public
policy, and to this extent the alleged rule fails. On this point one
judge says:
"No one in this world can derive a benefit from his own death.
By that final.event all earthly profit ends for him to whom it comes.
He is for this life equally beyond gain and loss, and as to him the rules
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that govern mundane intercourse become no longer applicable. Those
who derive the benefit have done no wrong. " 39
The second question is, is the individual of average intellect and
force of mind induced to commit suicide because he believes his es-
tate or beneficiaries will be benefited? In this case, if the contract
is allowed to be good, the benefit to the third person cannot be doubt-
ed. But when, in the mind of the insured, this knowledge of re-
sultant benefit to a third person comes in contact with the inherent
instinct of self preservation, the first and strongest instinct in man,
will there be in that person's mind an inducement to commit suicide,
or murder for the purpose of having himself executed, so that a third
person may receive the proceeds of an insurance policy? Eliminat-
ing that class of persons who contemplate suicide or crime at the time
of making the contract of insurance, it is believed that few if any
average minded persons would be induced by such contract to commit
crime or suicide. At least there would not be such number as would
warrant this so called doctrine of public policy which defeats the
clear and simple contract of parties concerned. There is much more
reason for saying that an estate limited on a life is void for the saine
reason. But as Justice Holmes rightly says:
"The law has no universal cynic fear of the temptation opened
by a pecuniary benefit accruing upon death. It shows no prejudice
against remainders after life estates, even by the rule in Shelly's
case."40
For the foregoing reasons it is submitted that the two principles
upon which Justice Harlan bases his decision in the Ritter Case are
unsound. If they are' unsound where suicide is the defense they are
equally unsound where legal execution is the defense, for as shown
above the Supreme Court restated these reasons as the basis for their
decision of the Burt and McCue Cases and said they were applicable
there.
One other proposition set out in the Burt and McCue Cases de-
mands attention. In the Burt Case it is said:
9Collins, Judge, in Campbell v. Supreme Conclave I. 0. H., supra.
4 Grigsby v. Russel, 224 U. S. 149, 56 L. Ed. 113, 36 L. R. A. (N.-S.) 642.
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"In other words, do insurance policies insure against crime?
"Is that a risk which enters into and becomes a part of the con-
tract."
The doctrine of the aforementioned cases when thus put in broad
sweeping statements seems hard to controvert, but in cases like those
under discussion, where nothing is said in the contract for or against
payment in case of death by crime or legal execution, this question,
it is submitted, is beside the point. The life insurance contract is for
the payment of a fixed sum on the happening of an inevitable event.
Life insurance is not concerned primarily with the individual but
with the group. The rates are based on the average expectancy of
life as determined by the mortality tables, and it is that fictitious
person, the average member of the group, with which thle contract is
concerned. It is not assumed by the insurer that any particular indi-
vidual will live any certain number of years, for such individual
may meet with misfortune, but the group is counted .on dying reg-
ularly.
"Whatever event may happen meanwhile is a matter of indiffer-
ence to the company. They do not found their calculations on that
but simply on the probabilities of human life, and get paid the full
value of the calculation." 41
Legal execution and suicide are causes of death and as such are
included in the calculations of the mortality tables and these con-
tingencies are a part' of the contract of life insurance unless expressly
exceptecI. Therefore, for the purpose of determining the validity
of the defense of legal execution of the insured in a suit on the policy,
whether the defense is claimed to be good on ground of public policy
or on the ground of fraud on the insurer, the proper question is not
as stated in the Burt Case, but where public policy is relied on the
question should be, whether it is against public policy for the insure-
to assume the risk of death by legal execution, and where fraud is re-
lied on, whether the parties contemplated death of the insured by
legal execution. As to the first question, for reasons shown above,
41 Vice Chancellor Wood, in Law v. London Indisputable Life P olicy Co., X
Ka)y & J., 229.
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death caused by inducement to legal execution and suicide under
this class of contracts, if it ever exists, is so slight as compared with
the volume of insurance, that there is no such appreciable danger of
injury to the public as to warrant the doctrine that such contracts
are against public policy as being insurance against crime. As to
the second question, it is submitted that with the proper conception
ff the nature of insurance in mind, it is clear that the insurer does
contemplate that some of the group may meet death by legal execu-
tion, for that is a cause of death. There is no fraud then on the in-
surer if the contract is fairly entered into, even tho an insured died
at the hands of justice, and no reason for the doctrine of implied
condition to the contract of life insurance excepting from the risk
such cause of death.
The foregoing criticisms of the doctrine of the Federal cases,
it is believed, clearly show that the principles enunciated therein are
unsound in reason. It is not necessary, however, tci rely upon these
criticisms. While there are but three cases decided by the courts of
the states upon the question of legal execution, and in two of these the
Federal rule was followed, and in the other, tho properly deciding
that the dsfense of legal execution was not good, but on an erroneous
assumption of the nature of the question, yet the majority of -the
courts have in some form disapproved or evaded the broad doctrine
laid down in the Ritter Case.42 One state has passed a statute which
enacts that suicide is not a defense unless contemplated when the
policy was secured.43  Since the public policy of the state
where the contract is made, must determine its validity, it
is hard to understand how the courts of such states, when
2Vance on Insurance, page 516; Darrow v. Society, 116 N. Y. 537, 22 N. E. 1093,
6 L. R. A. 495, 15 Am. St. Rep. 430; Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Groom, 86 Pa.
92, 27 Am. Rep. 689; John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 34 Mich. 46; Shultz
v. Ins. Co., 40 Ohio St. 217, 48 Am. Rep. 676; Kerr v. Association, 39 Minn. 174,
39 N. W. 312, 12 Am. St. Rep. 361; Grand Lodge Independent Order of Mutual Aid
v. Wieting, 168 I1l. 408, 48 N. E. 59, 61 Am. St. Rep. 123; Estabrook v. Ins. Co.,
54 Me. 224, 89 Am. Dec. 743; Supreme Conclave I. 0. H. v. Miles, 92 Md. 613, 48
Atil. 84, 84 Am. St. Rep. 528; Patterson v. Ins. Co., 100 Wis. 118, 75 N. W. 9s0,
42 L. R. A. 253, 69 Am. St. Rep. 899; Lange v. Royal Highlanders (Neb.) 110 N.
W. 110; Campbell v. Supreme Conclave I. 0. H., 6Q N. J. Law 274, 49 Atl. 55, 54
L. R. A. 676; Grand Legion, etc. v. Beatty, 224 Ill. 346, 79 N. E. 665, S L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1124 and note; Morton v. Supreme Council of Royal League, 100 Mo. App.
76, 73 S. W. 259.
4 2 Missouri Revised Statutes 1889, pee. 585 .
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they fully realize that the same doctrines of public policy are
involved in the legal execution cases as are involved in the suicide
cases, can consistently repudiate, evade and distinguish from the
principles of the Ritter Case, in cases where suicide is the defense,
and follow these same principles where legal execution is the defense.
They have not done so and it is not believed that they will.
The foregoing decisions go to show that in recent years the courts
are following the warning sounded by Lord Campbell in Moore v.
Woolsey, where he said:
"The supposed inducement to commit suicide under such cir-
cumstances cannot vitiate the condition more than the inducement
which the lessor may be supposed to have to commit murder should
render invalid a beneficial lease granted for lives.. When we are
called upon to nullify a contract on ground of public policy, we must
take care that we do not lay down a rule which may interfere with
the innocent and useful transactions of mankind. That the condition
under discussion may promote evil by leading to suicide, is a very
remote and improbable contingency; and it may frequently be very
beneficial by rendering a life policy safe security in the hands of an
assignee. "4
This view point is reflected by the Supreme Court of New Jersey
in this language:
I cannot see that the public good is more concerned to
prolong a life that may be worthless to the public than to secure cred-
itors their just demands, or afford a maintenance to wife and chil-
dren. Insurers may guard their interests in their contracts. I know
of no rule of public policy more useful than that which holds con-
tractors to their performance.''
45
And by the Supreme Court of Illinois it is said:
"If a man who is executed for a crime has at his death $1,000.00
in real estate, $1,000.00 in chattels, and $1,000.00 life insurance'pay-
able to his estate, his real estate descends to his heir, and his personal
chattels to .his administrator, but the $1,000.00 life insurance must be
left in the hands of the company who received the premiums because
10 4 El. & Bl. 243.
4Campbell v. Supreme Conclave I. 0. H., 66 N. J. Law 274, 49 Atl. 650, 54 L.
R. A. 576.
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it is said to be contrary to public policy to require the c~mpany
to pay, lest by so doing it- lend encouragement to other policyholder
to seek murder, and execution therefor, in order that their estates
or heirs might profit thereby. This is defendant in error's position.
This condition seems to border closely upon the absurd. We know
of no rule of public policy in this state that will ehiforce this species
of forfeiture, but there is a rule of law which has often been applied
when two parties make a valid contract and the same has been com-
pletely performed by one party and nothing remains except pfr-
formance by the other, which will compel performance or award dala-
ages for default against the delinquent party."
If there ever was need for this doctrine of public policy as to
insurance contracts, which was so skillfully created by the House of
Lords in the Bolland Case, and carried to the extreme by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the Ritter, Burt and McCue Cases, it
is believed that such doctrine is fast disappearing, because it does
"interfere with the innocent and useful transactions of mankind.'' 46
Justice Holmes says :47
"Life insurance has become in our days one of the best recog-
nized forms of investment and self-compelled saving."
The state courts have used many methods to evade this postulate
of public policy laid down by the two greatest courts in the world,
and they have done so because of the ever increasing development
and importance of life insurance as a necessary institution of society.
Many of the courts, to evade this doctrine, have made use of the
property theory of insurance, some declaring that it did not affect the
vested right of the beneficiary, and one court (Illinois) has carried the
property theory to the extreme to avoid it. It is believed. however,
that the time will soon -come when the courts will meet the question
squarely and relegate this so-called rule of public policy to the past-
from whence it came.
Therefore we conclude that the right to recover in an action on
a policy of insurance against the insurer for the proceeds thereof
"Lord Campbell in Moore v. Woolsey, supra.
47 Grigsby v. Russel, 222 U. S. 149, 32 Sup. Ct. 58, 56 L. Ed. 133, 36 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 642.
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where legal execution of the insured is made a defense, whether the
policy is made payable to the estate or personal representative, or to
a named beneficiary, with or without a vested interest, is to be de-
termined by the terms, conditions and validity of the contract of
insurance, and where death from such cause is not expressly excepted
from the risk, there is no sound reason or principle upon which such
provision can be made a term thereof by implication on the ground
that the parties did not contemplate death from such cause, or on the
ground that public policy prevents recovery on the contract if such
risk is contemplated, but the good faith intention of the parties ex-
pressed in the contract should control.
